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Abstract 
 
The declining Zimbabwean economy has resulted in corruption reaching epidemic 
proportions. There is a high tolerance for it in society as it is seen as the only way to get 
timely service or any service at all especially in the public sector which is infested with petty 
corruption. Through some examples this paper reveals that in the education, health, justice, 
transport and custom sectors it is common to find public servants charging extra for services, 
seeking small favours, or using pubic facilities and materials for their own marginal personal 
gain. Payment of a bribes is now a normal and accepted way of doing business and is no 
longer viewed by most as an immoral act. Whilst the causes of this petty or bureaucratic 
corruption can be easily identified it is important to understand the nature and culture of 
corruption, how it moves from one level to the next. This paper uses an agency model of 
corruption whose setup has been widely cited and serves as a foundation for empirical 
research and policy design to combat bureaucratic corruption to show that the public 
officials rationally make a choice to be corrupt by weighing key determinants which are, the 
return of corruption against public wage levels, the penalty and probability of being detected. 
Paying particular attention to the customs sector this paper uses the multi-equilibria model 
by Andvig and Moene, (1989) “How corruption may corrupt” to show that the increase in the 
bribe price in the short-run beyond a certain level may result in a shift to a high level 
corruption equilibrium which is reversible if the bribe price decreases beyond a certain level. 
However in the long-run this reversal may be difficult and the sector may be stuck in the high 
level corruption equilibrium. The ratchet effects of corruption in both the supply and demand 
may result in its continuity and movement towards full corruption in some parts of the 
customs sector. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
With the Zimbabwean economy in doldrums corruption has become an accepted and almost 
expected way of doing business especially in the public sector. If a civil servant still goes to 
work today it is not because of the salary but the opportunities to enhance his paltry income 
with corrupt acts using the organizations‟ resources.  
 
1.1.1 Defining corruption 
Although there are many definitions of corruption there is a consensus that corruption refers 
to the acts in which the power and influence of the public office is used for personal gain 
which may not be monetary at the expense of the common good and in violation of 
established laws, principles, regulations and ethical considerations. A commonly used 
definition is:  
 
 “The abuse of public office for private gain”. 
 
Public office is abused for private gain when an official accepts, solicits, or exhorts a bribe. It 
is also abused when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and 
processes for competitive advantage and profit. Public office can also be abused for personal 
benefit even if no robbery occurs, through patronage and nepotism, the theft of assets or the 
diversion of state revenues. (World Bank, 1997, p.8) 
 
Those in the public office include politicians and public sectors officials who may be high or 
low level bureaucrats. There are two major types of corruption that these officials engage in 
which are grand and petty corruption as shown in fig 1. According to Arvind K. Jain (2001), 
grand corruption (relationship 1) generally refers to the acts of the political elite by which 
they exploit their power to make economic policies. As elected officials, or in the 
government‟s role of a benevolent social guardian (Krueger 1993), politicians are supposed to 
make resource allocation decisions based solely upon the interests of their principals – the 
populace. A political elite that is corrupt can change either the national policies or their 
implementation to serve its own interests at some cost to the populace.  
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Figure 1: Corrupt relationships    
                                                
                                                  Political Leaders 
                                     
                                                      (2)    Appoint 
                                                            
                                             High Level Bureaucrats 
     
       Elects          (1)                       (2)    Appoint                     Make Public Policy 
                                                       
                                              Low Level Bureaucrats    
                                               
             Population     (2)    Provide services  
                                                       
                                              Benefits from Corruption 
Source: Jain 2001  
 
This type of corruption may have the most serious consequences for a society as evidenced by 
the effects of the Land Redistribution Programme in Zimbabwe in 1999 when the political 
elite hand picked multiple farms (even those bought for resettlement with public funds) and 
registered some in the names of family members to evade the official one-farm policy. In 
some cases they even drove poor peasant farmers off the land they had recently been resettled 
on. They also redirected huge funds from Canada, Kuwait and England provided to buy land 
for resettlement.  
 
This paper will focus on bureaucratic corruption (relationship 2) which refers to corrupt acts 
of the appointed bureaucrats in their dealings with their superiors (the political elite) or with 
the public. This is usually known as „petty or bureaucratic corruption‟ with the public bribing 
bureaucrats either to receive a service to which they are entitled, speed up a bureaucratic 
procedure or even be provided with a service that is not supposed to be available in a 
particular department. This petty corruption is probably the most widespread in Zimbabwe 
and is deeply embedded in the public sector where one encounters it almost everyday. 
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For corruption to take place Jain says that there are three elements that should co-exist. First 
one must have discretionary power, then there must be economic rents associated with this 
power and the legal/judicial system must offer sufficiently low probability of detection and/or 
penalty for the wrongdoing. All these together with other factors that favour corruption are 
present in Zimbabwe making it a fertile breeding ground for both grand and bureaucratic 
corruption.  
 
The greater the discretionary powers, ceteris paribus, the stronger the incentive for the 
political elite or bureaucrat to succumb to temptation. Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-
Lobaton (1998) argue that more discretion and regulations for officials “… leads to a higher 
effective burden on business, more corruption, and a greater incentive to move to the 
unofficial economy” (p.387) This is evident in Zimbabwe were the political elite who have 
discretionary powers to transfer large volumes of assets and funds from public to private 
hands have done so to the detriment of the society at large. 
 
For the public officials to engage in corrupt acts they must believe that the utility of the 
income from corruption is worth the inconveniences caused by the penalties associated with 
such acts. The probability of being detected, prosecuted, and punished is closely related to the 
values and structures of the society. These ideas can be summarised in the relationship below: 
 
Net utility of corruption = f Income from corruption, 
                                              Legitimate income (or fair wages), 
                                              Strength of political institutions, 
                                              Moral and political values of the society, 
                                              Probability of being caught and punished  
 
The poorly compensated public servants in the country have powerful financial incentives to 
search for additional sources of income through corrupt acts as the purchasing power of their 
wage is almost nothing and any income from corruption is likely to be higher than their 
salaries. The moral and political values of the society are constantly being tested and eroded. 
The judicial system has the reputation of applying the law in an inconsistent and capricious 
manner with most in this sector having disregard for the laws, rules and procedures they are 
supposed to enforce. The governmental leaders who sidestep laws are rarely prosecuted and 
convicted due to the compromised role of the prosecuting function of the state. The attorney 
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general, who has the discretion to decide whether or not to prosecute, is a political appointee 
therefore his discretion is generally not exercised against political colleagues or to the 
detriment of the ruling party. Also the penalties provided for corruption are trivial considering 
the benefits derived from most corrupt acts. There is minimal accountability and supervision 
in the public sectors. Clearly all these factors result in a positive net utility of corruption in the 
public sector. 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
It is evident from the statistics of Transparency International (TI) that the corruption levels in 
Zimbabwe have been gradually increasing. The presence and character of corruption varies 
significantly from sector to sector and it is important to know how the corruption in these 
different sectors is progressing and changing from one level to the next. This will provide a 
better understanding of the corruption levels of the country as a whole both currently and in 
the future and will also help in the formulation and implementation of more sector sensitive 
policies to combat corruption. One of the sectors that has seen a huge increase in corruption 
and which this paper will focus on is the customs sector. There has been an increase in both 
the demand and supply of corrupt acts as more and more people are importing both luxury 
goods and basic necessities from neighbouring countries mainly South Africa, Botswana and 
Zambia and as far of as Japan, China and Singapore. Although the corruption has been on an 
increase the question is “Will the sector reach a high level corruption equilibrium of 
corruption and if so is this situation reversible?”  
 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The study provides some insight into how corruption has managed to infiltrate into all the 
public sectors of the economy through the some examples of common cases of corruption in 
the country. Then focusing on the customs sector the paper wants to answer these questions: 
 What are the likely future levels of corruption in the customs sector both in the short 
run and in the long run? 
  Will the sector remain at these levels of corruption or will they change as the factors 
that affect corruption also change? 
 How do the ratchet effects of supply and demand of corruption affect the levels of 
corruption in this sector? 
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1.4 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
On 15 September 2008 Robert Mugabe, the leader of the ruling party, Zimbabwe African 
National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU - PF) and the opposition leaders, Morgan Tsvangirai 
and Arthur Mutambara of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), signed a power-
sharing deal, aimed at resolving the country's political and economic crisis. With the 
formation of the new unity governement the nation hopes that some of the ills that have been 
affecting the country like corruption will finally be dealt with as the economy recovers. When 
and if the agreement is finally honoured it might be tempting to assume that with the 
improvement of the state of the economy will come an automatic decrease in corruption. This 
may not be so especially if the major public sectors like the customs have reached high levels 
of corruption. If the nature and culture of corruption in the different sectors is not understood 
and addressed accordingly together with other policies to revive the economy, corruption will 
slow down the path to recovery for the nation in a great way. The donor money that has been 
pledged by other countries to help the country will likely fall prey to the corrupt government 
officials and not achieve its intended goals. 
 
1.5 METHODOLOGY 
This paper uses two models to show how the ratchet effects on the supply and demand side of 
corruption affect the equilibrium level of corruption. The main model is Andvig and Moene‟s 
1989 multi - equilibria model on “How corruption may corrupt” whose hypothesis is that the 
same socioeconomic structure can give rise to different levels of corruption. This model 
shows that the profitability of corruption is related to its frequency and focuses on purely 
economically motivated corruption. It centres its analysis on petty corruption by public 
bureaucrats and does not consider political corruption as it would require a different approach. 
It looks at the incentives for demanding and supplying corrupt acts as well as the possible 
multiple equilibria in corruption that may result in the short and long run depending on the 
different distributions of the costs over the bureaucrats and the bribe price. The second model 
shows how ratchet effects on the demand side affect the corruption levels and may lead to full 
corruption by using an example of bus drivers bribing the customs officials to reduce their 
waiting time at the border. 
 
 
 
  
6 
1.6 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
Corruption can be found in all facets of the Zimbabwean economy be it the private or public 
sector. However this paper concentrates on the public sectors mainly the customs sector 
which contributes greatly to the overall corruption in the country. It will mostly focus on 
corruption that takes place at the Beitbridge border post between Zimbabwe and South Africa 
which is the busiest border post in Southern Africa. This post has seen an increase in the 
number of cross-border or bulk traders that go to South Africa to buy basic commodities to 
sell in Zimbabwe as well as individual shoppers who cross over mostly to Musina about 13km 
from the border in South Africa‟s Limpopo province to buy essentials for their families and 
friends. The customs is one of the sectors in which the government could be accumulating a 
lot of revenue especially the much needed foreign currency but due to the rampant corruption 
in this sector it is not the case.  
 
1.7 ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER 
Chapter 2 gives a brief insight into the state of the economy and the corruption levels in the 
country. Chapter 3 looks at some of the common cases of corruption in the public sector 
encountered on a daily basis by the average citizen mostly based on the interviews carried out 
with both the bribers and the bribees in the sector. Chapter 4 explains the theories of demand 
and supply of corruption using the two models mentioned above and Chapter 5 concludes the 
paper giving some ideas for future researches. 
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Chapter 2 
 Background and Extent of Bureaucratic Corruption in Zimbabwe 
About 80 percent of the approximately 11,6 million
1
 people  in Zimbabwe are  living in 
poverty with 56% of the population living on US $1 a day whilst 80% live on less than US $2 
a day
2
, there is an 80 percent unemployment level and the last official inflation rate was 231 
million
3
 for July 2008, the highest in the world whilst the unofficial inflation rate on 14 
November 2008 was at an unbelievable  89.7 Sextillion (10
21
) percent
4
. Prices are doubling 
every two to three days. The Zimbabwe dollar is practically worthless and most shops and 
businesses now trade with the United States (US) dollar or the South African (SA) rand as 
they are the “official” currencies. 
 
At the time of independence in 1980, Zimbabwe had a much more developed economy than 
most other nations in Sub-Sahara Africa due to its great diversity and quality of natural 
resources. Other than South Africa, Zimbabwe had the most developed capital market in 
Africa, leading one scholar in 1983 to proclaim, “Independent Zimbabwe is a success” 
(Davidow 1982). The most unanimous opinion condensed from audit reports, donor reports, 
household surveys, business environment and enterprise surveys, legislative reports and 
diagnostic studies available between 1980 -1987 was that the incidences of corruption though 
present were minimal no matter how they were defined and the state enjoyed a relatively high 
level of integrity with very few cases of grand corruption. 
 
According to John Makumbe in his 1994 paper “Bureaucratic Corruption In Zimbabwe: 
Causes and Magnitude of the Problem,” this grand corruption was amongst the avaricious 
bourgeoisie which had spent about ten to thirteen years in prison, exile or simply outside the 
country during the liberation struggle and had been brought into power by the national 
independence and started devising all kinds of ways of also getting their „deserved‟ share of 
the country‟s wealth. Their integration into the hitherto „whites only‟ socioeconomic fabric, 
by virtue of their political and bureaucratic positions, resulted in the creation of what a local 
analyst called nouveau riches, who became part of the 4 percent who owned 90 percent of all 
the wealth of Zimbabwe. The magnitude of bureaucratic corruption continued to increase and 
                                                 
1
 2002 Zimbabwe Census 
2
 Poverty Assessment Study 2006 
3
 Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office (CSO) 2008 
4
 H:\Zimbabwe Inflation by Steve Hanks.htm                                                                                  
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the press began to expose it; university students demonstrated against it; and the President 
was forced by public outcry, to take some action in the Willowvale Motor Vehicle  Case 
(1988) in which top government officials abused their positions to source many cars each 
from the government – owned automobile assembly plant and resold the vehicles at a 
tremendous profit. Many other cases of corruption followed over the years contributing to the 
economic downfall of the country as those involved in corruption are not creating or 
generating wealth but rather consuming it and exacerbating the mismatch between aggregate 
supply and demand hence driving up the inflation rate.  
 
Zimbabwe is the 14th most corrupt nation out of a total of 180 countries recently surveyed by 
Transparency International. The 2008 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores 180 countries 
on a scale from zero (highly corrupt) to ten (highly clean). Zimbabwe, which is ranked 166th 
had a score of 1,8 on the CPI scale indicating that the country is slowly heading towards the 
highly corrupt level. From Table 1 and 2 with the CPI Indices and inflation figures it is clear 
that as the political, economic and social crisis has deepened, so has the corruption. 
Correlation, however, does not imply causality.  
 
Table 1: Corruption Perception Indices for Zimbabwe from 1998 - 2008 
Year Rank CPI Score Std Dev Surveys Confidence 
    Used Interval 
1998 43 4,2 2,2 6 - 
1999 45 4,1 1,4 9 - 
2000 65 3 1,5 7 0.6-4.9 
2001 65 2,9 2,9 6 1.6-4.7 
2002 71 2,7 0,5 6 2.0-3.3 
2003 106 2,3 0,3 7 2.0-2.7 
2004 114 2,3 - 7 1.9-2.7 
2005 107 2,6 - 7 2.1-3.0 
2006 130 2,4 - 7 2.0-2.8 
2007 150 2,1 - 8 1.9-2.3 
2008 166 1,8 - 7 1.5-2.1 
Source: Transparency International  
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Explanatory notes 
 
CPI Score – measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in a given country and 
is a composite index, drawing on different expert and business surveys from business people, 
academics and risk analysts. It ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
 
Confidence range – provides a range of possible values of the CPI score. This reflects how a 
country‟s score may vary depending on measurement and precision. Normally with a 5 
percent probability the score is above this range and with another 5 percent it is below. 
However particularly when only a few sources are available, an unbiased estimate of the 
mean coverage probability is lower than the nominal value of 90%. 
 
Surveys used – refers to the number of surveys that assessed a country‟s performance. At least 
3 surveys are required for a country to be included in the CPI. 
 
Standard deviation – indicates the differences in the values of the sources; the greater the  
standard deviation the greater the differences of perceptions of a country among the sources. 
 
Table 2: Zimbabwe’s Inflation Rate from 1998 - 2008 
1336,6* = Inflation rate for January 2005 
 
231million* = Inflation rate for June 2008 
 
NB: All other inflation rates are for December of each year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Central Statistical Office 
Year Inflation% 
1998 48 
1999 56,9 
2000 55,2 
2001 112,1 
2002 198,9 
2003 598,7 
2004 1336,6* 
2005 585,8 
2006 1281,1 
2007 66212,3 
2008 231million* 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
SOME CASES OF CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
The public sectors in Zimbabwe are afflicted by many dysfunctions that affect most African 
bureaucracies and promote corruption like „permanent‟ and „occasional‟ absenteeism 
(Nembot 2000; 298; Morice 1987); slow administrative procedures (Sarassoro 1979); 
dilapidated administrations which are ill-adapted to social change (Asibuo 1992); rigid, 
impersonal and ritualized implementation of the rules (Schwartz 1974); complex and opaque 
regulations that are difficult to apply and leave infinite scope for discretional powers 
(Fjeldstad 2003; Hope 2000; McMullan 1961); the centralization of decision-making 
processes and lack of delegation at subordinate levels of the administration (Cohen 1980); 
inadequate archiving or its complete absence; poor division of tasks and functions in both 
spatial and sectoral terms (Darbon 2001: 29). 
 
Although the presence and character of corruption varies significantly from sector to sector it 
is common that the government officials are charging extra for services, seeking small 
favours, or using pubic facilities and materials for their own direct or indirect marginal 
personal gain. Below is a brief presentation of a few corrupt acts that take place in some of 
the public sectors in the country. To get these accounts I interviewed a number of government 
officials and people from the general public. It was not easy to have formal interviews on this 
rather sensitive subject so in most cases the interviews were rather informal but very 
informative. Corruption is now the norm in Zimbabwe and some people are willing to discuss 
it openly as long as they are assured that what they say will not get them into some form of 
trouble. It almost an accepted way of doing business. It is not to say though that there are no 
more honest people in the country and all the government officials have to be bribed to do 
their job. But as soon as one steps into the country they are confronted with corruption left, 
right and centre and it becomes both frustrating and impossible to ignore. More so at the 
points of entry into the country especially the customs offices at the Beitbridge border post, 
the airport, and the roads leading to and from the border. The different accounts that I 
gathered on my field trip are written in italics and they are more or less as the interviewees 
narrated them to me. Some of the accounts are my own experiences as like I mentioned above 
it is difficult to avoid. 
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3.1 Justice System 
“Corruption within the justice system is generally defined as the use of public authority for 
personal gain that results in the improper delivery of judicial services and legal protection for 
citizens.”(Mary Noel Pepys, Fighting Corruption in Developing Countries, Strategies and 
Analyses, 2005 pg13). Some of the main players in the justice system are the judges, lawyer, 
public prosecutors, the police, court clerks, the secretarial staff, prison wardens and prison 
guards. The role of the judiciary is to protect human rights and civil liberties by ensuring the 
right to a fair trial by a competent and impartial tribunal. Ideally all citizens are entitled to 
equal access to the courts and equal treatment by the investigative bodies, prosecutorial 
authorities, and the courts themselves regardless of their position in the society. In Zimbabwe 
the judiciary is not independent but controlled by the government which has placed its own 
appointees in strategic posts in the legal system. The phenomenon of corruption has obviously 
not spared this sector in which the powerful and rich can escape arrest, prosecution, 
conviction, and literally „buy justice‟ whilst the poor are excluded from their rightful access to 
fair and effective judicial services. 
 
The workers in the justice system including the judges receive dismally low salaries and are 
forced to perform their duties with meagre financial resources under abominable working 
conditions that consist of crowded office space and dilapidated courtrooms among many 
others. It is unfortunate that the judges who are the ultimate decision makers and the highest 
governmental officials within the justice system and should be the focal points for reducing 
corruption promoting the rule of law have to engage in unlawful acts sometimes with their 
subordinates to make ends meet. The following examples show how corruption has spread 
across the whole spectrum of the judicial system: 
 
At the Harare Magistrates Court in the capital city there is a pending case of a foreign 
currency dealer who allegedly stole US $80 000 from his associate. He was arrested 
and taken to the police station. I am sure the policemen that caught him would have 
accepted a bribe from him had he not been on the wanted list for other pending fraud 
cases. In prison he managed to bribe the prison guard with US $5 000 to ask a 
magistrate to grant him bail. This was too good an offer to refuse for a prison guard 
who is paid approximately US $1 per month. In court the magistrate gave him bail 
and received US $1 000 whilst the prison guard received US $500. He promised to 
pay him the rest at a later date although this is highly unlikely. Out on bail he went to 
  
12 
the court clerks who are in charge of the criminal files and bribed them with US $800 
so that they steal his file for him. With no case file and out on bail he is continuously 
on further remand. The complainant will be lucky if he ever gets his money back. Out 
of the US $80 000 he stole this dealer spent less than a tenth of that money in bribing 
the government officials so that he stays out of prison. 
                                                                                      User of the court, Harare    
 
Corruption within the criminal process is very common because for a good sum the police can 
suppress the filing of police reports, distort, destroy or even steal evidence. Sometimes they 
just refuse to investigate or even protect the alleged perpetrator if he is politically powerful or 
wealthy. Corruption within the civil process is also widespread with the court clerks having 
the power to expedite or delay a case without detection. For the right price they can even 
completely destroy a case file.                                                                                                          
 
I had 25 cows stolen from my farm three months ago and when the culprits were 
caught I hoped that they would be sent to prison for at least 25 years because livestock 
theft carries with it a huge penalty but with this corrupt judicial system nothing was 
done to them. Although the case went to court the criminals bribed all those handling 
the case even the judge, who some say got around US $1 000 and the prosecutor US 
$500. About 50kg of the recovered meat that was supposed to be presented as an 
exhibit was said to have been eaten by the police in their canteen imagine. So with no 
exhibit there was no case and the thieves got away. 
                                                                                                                          Farmer, Kwekwe 
 
Some men from Harare were caught selling elephant horns here in Kwekwe because 
the price here is reportedly higher and they were arrested. Their horns which were 
worth around US $25 000 disappeared in the hands of the Central Investigation 
Department (CID) officers. So although the police had opened a docket for the case 
there was no exhibit to present. The CID officers responsible for the mysterious 
disappearance of the horns are said to have paid the judge and the prosecutor a total 
of US $2 500. The owners of the horns who were released because of lack of evidence 
want their horns back and are now hunting down these CID officers.                                                                                  
                                                                                                                  Police officer, Kwekwe 
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In some cases the powers of the CID now go beyond the domain of investigation and extend 
unofficially to aspects of sentencing. Many cases do not even go to court as they are settled by 
the police officers, usually without the knowledge of the judge. For example if one sells a car 
for US $20 000 and does not get his money and reports the case to the police instead of 
placing a charge against the alleged thief the policeman can approach the thief and tell him of 
the consequences of being charged and taken to prison. The policeman then suggests that he 
pays US $5 000 every week and if he has US $5 000 he can pay it there and then to the 
disgruntled seller. The policeman can then ask for a bribe of about US $200 for this favour 
from the accused and on taking the US $5 000 to the owner of the car will also get another US 
$200 for having facilitated this agreement. Where one reports a theft but does not know who 
the culprit is and only has a suspect the policeman can approach the suspect and make him 
aware of what will happen to him if he is charged and taken to prison just to scare him. The 
policeman can demand a bribe depending on the gravity of the accusation so that they do not 
arrest him. But then being just a suspect and without any evidence nothing would have 
happened to him. 
                                                                                       
At times the police and magistrates are coerced into making corrupt decisions out of fear of 
retribution. Being perceived as politically incorrect and unpatriotic makes many in the legal 
system decide against their better judgements. As a result there are many public officials that 
have committed a lot of crimes but have never seen the door of a court house let alone that of 
a jail cell. In some cases depending on their positions in the ruling party, they can get 
presidential pardon as in the Willowvale Motor Vehicle Case where some of the accused who 
were not forced to resign although convicted and sentenced are still involved in politics and or 
government with positions of high authority. This shows how the legal system is to some 
extent controlled by the ruling party and that ones‟ political affiliation can grant him 
„immunity‟ when it comes to the law. 
 
3.2 Health Sector 
The role of the government in the health sector is to promote equitable access to services, 
assure sustainable financing for health objectives and prevent the spread of disease. But 
mainly due to corruption the Zimbabwean government has failed to perform these functions 
leading to inadequate and unequal access, poor quality of health care and inefficient services. 
The gravity of the problem in the health system came into light when the country was hit by a  
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cholera epidemic in August 2008 that up to date has killed 2024 with at least 40,000
5
 having 
contracted the disease. This is the worst cholera outbreak in Africa since 1999 when 2,085 
people died in Nigeria
6
. The waterborne disease, which causes severe diarrhoea and 
dehydration expectedly spread to all 10 provinces of the country mainly due to lack of clean 
water and sanitation. 
 
Every year an estimated 1 300 to 2 800 mothers die from causes associated with pregnancy 
and childbirth and 12 000 people are estimated to die every month from Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) related illnesses
7
. Most of these deaths are due to lack of access 
to drugs, essential equipment and other supplies in health facilities. Malnutrition has reached 
epic proportions, with five million people requiring food aid this year. Under-funding of the 
Ministry of Health has led to a lack of the necessary resources needed to cope with even 
curable ailments like cholera. Industrial action by health professionals over very low salaries 
has often affected the country‟s health delivery services, while a serious brain drain is a 
contributory factor to the crippling of the sector.  
In November 2008 the government closed the major public hospitals in Harare and the second 
biggest city Bulawayo as they had been operating without running water, no functioning 
toilets, no soap, empty pharmacies and not enough food for patients or staff for three months. 
Zimbabwe once a leader in health care, medical and nursing education also closed its medical 
school in the same month and cancelled exams because there was no paper and ink to print 
the exam papers. The main mortuary in the capital has been operating without electricity so 
the dead are rotting. 
A government doctor is paid a monthly salary less than US $100 and there is no reward for 
exceptional performance so corruption has become a survival strategy for both the 
government workers and the patients. The theft of drugs/supplies for personal use or resale in 
the private sector is now very common in the public hospitals. Some drugs that are supposed 
to be given to the patients for free are being sold to them and at times the prices are 
unbelievably high considering that the drugs were supposed to be for free. Because of these 
under-the-table payments to obtain drugs there is now a lower utilization of drugs amongst the 
patients as some just cannot afford. Most are no longer getting proper treatment as they have 
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to make do with the drugs that are available. There is also interruption of treatment or 
incomplete treatment leading to the development of antimicrobial resistance.        
Now some nurses only come to work on the days that they know the dispensary will be 
open so that they can steal medication and sell to us. On the days that the dispensary 
is closed which are many we are attended to by the student nurses. But what can they 
do, they complain of inadequate salaries and we cannot blame them; it is just that us 
the patients are the ones who are suffering. 
                                                                                   Patient, Kwekwe General Hospital 
 
Some essential services which ideally should be readily available to the patients are being 
diverted for personal use. 
 
Ambulances are now being used as taxis for ferrying passengers whilst patients are 
being taken to hospitals in wheelbarrows. The drivers are shamelessly switching on 
the sirens as they „pilot‟ (taking people from one point to the next) .The other day I 
was called to the scene of an accident involving an ambulance only to find out on my 
arrival that there were about 15 passengers that were on their way to Gweru from 
Kwekwe. Luckily there were no casualties but „zvinonyadzisa‟ (its embarrassing) what 
these economic hardships are making us resort to. 
                                                                                         Police Officer, Kwekwe 
 
The above description of the state of the ailing health sector shows how the bad governance of 
the country coupled with corruption has resulted in great social costs. 
 
3.3 Education Sector 
This sector has not been impervious to the pervasive corruption that has penetrated the public 
sector. Before the economic downfall that has haunted Zimbabwe for the last decade, teachers 
used to be among the highly paid professionals and they could afford a decent life. With the 
budgetary allocation to the education sector by the government being far less than the 26% 
required by United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) the 
salaries of the teachers are so low that they cannot even afford transportation to work for the 
whole month. They are even being urged by the government to take on projects to supplement 
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their salaries. As a result many are making students sell their products like sweets, „freezits‟ 
(frozen juice in 50ml packets) or „maputi‟ (popcorn) for them during break time: 
 
I am very good in maths so my teacher likes me because I give the correct change and 
I also sell a lot of sweets. I would want to play more with my friends during our break 
but I have to do this for ma‟am, I cannot refuse. I do not want her to give me bad 
marks or something like that. On some days when I sell a lot she also gives me one or 
two sweets.  
                                                                                                             Grade Six Pupil, Chegutu 
 
Some are taking regular vacations or are just absent from schools to do cross-border trading 
and when they leave there are either not replaced or they are replaced by untrained school 
leavers who also leave after very short periods of time. Teachers collecting salaries but not 
providing the intended instruction is probably the most common form of corruption in this 
sector but justified by most. An estimated 50 000 teachers have left Zimbabwe for greener 
pastures to date
8
 since the economic downturn. Some have gone to the United Kingdom 
where they are reportedly doing odd jobs like caring for the old, while some have gone to 
work in the farms and as housemaids or gardeners in neighbouring Botswana and South 
Africa. 
 
Unlike the educational funding system in the industrialized countries, education has 
traditionally been the financial responsibility of the government like in most African 
countries. Unfortunately due to gross economic mismanagement the government is now 
turning aggressively to already poverty stricken parents to bear the heavy burden of the 
astronomical costs of education and literally take care of the teachers in the public schools. 
 
For the teachers to come to school and teach our children we have to bring them 
groceries at the beginning of the term. Each child has to go with salt, sugar, cooking 
oil and soap on the first day of school if they want to be allowed to sit in class. Us 
parents are already struggling to access these basic commodities for our families 
without having to worry about the teachers‟ groceries too.  
                                                      Parent of a Pupil at Sally Mugabe Primary School, Kwekwe 
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Another common form of petty corruption is the selling of admissions at all levels of 
education. 
 
In these times of economic hardships my colleagues were really surprised when I 
refused a bribe from a parent whose child had dismally failed the entrance test to get 
into the first grade. I was not intimidated by his expensive car and suit and I told him 
point blank that “Your son has failed so we cannot accept him here.” He then told me 
that if I helped him then he will show his gratitude in a big way and handed me a 
khaki envelope. I could tell that it contained a lot of money because it was really thick 
but I did not even bother to open it. He surely looked and sounded like a man who was 
used to getting his own way but I showed him that it was not the way we did things 
here that is why we manage to keep our good reputation. 
                                                                                                           Secretary at a Public School, Chegutu 
 
The University of Zimbabwe uses the point system to screen and place the students into 
different programs. But some students with low points are being admitted and/or getting into 
programmes that they are not qualified for academically but financially. This is seen as more 
and more students are struggling to keep up in their respective programmes and subsequent 
background checks reveal that they do not qualify to be in certain programmes. The lecturers 
cannot do much about it as this corruption usually involves the university‟s top officials. 
Corruption is also evident in opportunities to study abroad. Information of available 
scholarships is not posted on the notice boards for all the students to have an equal 
opportunity to apply to, it is reserved for a select few closely linked to the chairperson‟s of the 
various departments. Sometimes a directive of who must get the scholarship can even come 
from high ranking government officials hence denying the deserving candidates the 
opportunity to further their studies. 
 
I know that I was not supposed to have come here because another teacher had 
already been awarded the scholarship but then when I learnt of it I went to my uncle 
who just made one phone call and the scholarship was given to me instead. It took 
some difficulties to have the name changed but when people heard who had 
recommended me they really could not say anything. 
                                                                                                                                                       Student, Europe 
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This student did not manage to finish his degree and the scholarship went to waste. It may not 
have been the case had it been used by its initial deserving recipient. These examples above 
provide just a glimpse of the petty corruption that takes place in the education sector. 
 
3.4 Government tenders and public procurement 
Most examination committees for government tenders abuse their discretionary powers or 
stimulate an open and fair competition (especially through the means of prior agreements 
between firms or the creation of fictitious firms).  
 
When I am applying for a tender I always make sure that I send my tender last when 
my „associates‟ on the board have gone through all the other tenders and they tell me 
the figures that will make me win the tender. It would be suspicious if my company 
always won the tenders so I change the name all the time and create fictitious 
companies. I usually give my „associates‟ a reasonable percentage of what I make. If I 
do not do this I will not get the tenders. I also have „associates‟ in the accounting 
department so that I can get my payment on time. 
                                                                                                       Entrepreneur, Harare  
 
In 2006 the then Chairman of the parastatal Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO) 
and its Chief Executive, who was also the deputy Minister of Information were charged for 
jointly receiving US $20 000 after the Chairman solicited US $85 000 from Shah Gift‟s 
Investment firm to facilitate a contract to supply buses. The Chairman was convicted and 
given a jail sentence for two years but nothing was done to the Chief Executive although he 
was forced to resign after audit reports showed a lot of unexplainable discrepancies. The 
reports also revealed that there were no proper purchasing procedures leading to the payment 
of people who had not supplied anything to the company. For example one of the reports 
notes that a payment of Z $64million was made to someone who had not supplied anything to 
the company. False requisitions of what is already in stock are very common in parastatals. 
Corruption at the lowest levels in this parastatal involves drivers sometimes not issuing tickets 
so that they may pocket the money at the end of day. The cash collection from bus income is 
not properly accounted for and there is no proper supervision of the work of the junior staff so 
chances of the drivers being caught are very low. 
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3.5 Media 
Journalism should be the eyes of the people and the ears of the society but in Zimbabwe it is 
also infested with corruption. This is mainly due to the poor remuneration, unfavourable 
working conditions and non-existent fringe benefits for the workers. There are a lot of bribery 
cases involving the state owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation (ZBC) TV and Radio 
bosses, broadcasters and electronic print journalists. Bribes are demanded from business 
executives, politicians and musicians who will be given sustained and positive media 
coverage, continuous air play and better ratings on local music and business charts.  
 
For an advert that costs Z $100 000 for three minutes I pay for three slots a day with  
Z $300 000 but can even get up to seven slots per day if I just give the broadcaster      
Z $30 000 per extra slot. All that is required is proof of payment on my part because I 
understand no-one really checks if what is on the invoice tallies with the number of 
slots I am given that day. 
                                                                                                       Entrepreneur, Harare 
 
The main corrupt practices in the transport and customs sectors involve these three main 
areas: 
      a)  the identification of road users – the checking of drivers licences 
b) the technical and administrative status of vehicles – vehicle registration, technical 
inspection, insurance, general external appearance. 
c) transported goods and customs duty. 
 
For the users of these transport and customs services i.e. importers, exporters, taxi, truck and 
bus drivers time is crucial and any minute that they save enhances their competitiveness on 
the market. As a result they are vulnerable to corruption by the customs officials and the 
police. Sometimes they even take the initiative and offer the bribe so that they do not waste 
time even if their affairs are in order. 
 
3.6 Transport Sector 
3.6.1 Driving licence 
During driving tests the instructors point out to the testers the candidates that have paid. The 
ones that have not paid usually fail unless they bring other resources into play like family ties 
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or networks of relatives, friends and acquaintances. If the candidates have not arranged with 
their instructor they sometimes give the bribes, usually approximately US $50 to the 
examiners during the tests. These examiners are not hesitant to tell the candidates that if they 
do not „make a plan‟ it will take time before they get their licence whether they can drive or 
not. 
 
After having been driving for almost 20 years without a licence and getting away with bribing 
the police in Zimbabwe a move to South Africa prompted a certain gentleman to get an 
International driving licence. He explained to me: 
 
In South Africa the police can stop you anytime and it‟s unlike Zimbabwe were you 
are certain that you can bribe your way out. Here it‟s a foreign land so it‟s just good 
to have a licence. I have really been reluctant to bribe for a Class 4 licence because I 
know that even though I can drive they will make me fail so that they get something 
from me. This time I had no choice I had to pay US $100 to get this International 
driving licence that I am using here in South Africa. 
 
To get a car cleared or acquire a registration book for ones‟ car at the Zimbabwe Revenue 
Authourity (ZIMRA) offices one usually has to bribe the officials who like the customs 
officials at the border have the discretionary powers of lowering the value of a car. 
 
3.6.2 Road checks 
The customs officials and the police officers who carry out road checks exploit people‟s lack 
of time. The police order the drivers to park and give them their custom clearance documents, 
putting the driver under unnecessary pressure of the possibility of being told to unload their 
goods or having them seized although the officers have no mandate to perform customs 
duties. The drivers are not aware of this and just want to be on their way so they are easily 
bribed usually for SA 10 rands per passenger.  
 
Sometimes if all the drivers‟ papers are in order for example the driving licence, insurance 
certificate and registration papers they can just bluntly ask the driver to leave them “yedrink” 
(money for a drink) or say “tinyareiwoka” (will you just please respect us and give us 
something) or “tipeiwo yeweekend” (can you give us some money for the weekend) or 
“ingoitai kuti tiende” (may you just give us something so that we go away and stop bothering 
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you). They can even find some jokes to say so that the driver relaxes, for example “How can 
you be travelling in such nice cars in these difficult times? Please do leave us something.” If 
this does not work they may resort to less friendlier means to get money from the motorists: 
 
I really did not have any money on me when I was stopped at a police roadblock. I 
tried to explain this to them but they would not listen. In these cash crises times it is 
possible that one can actually not have any money on them although have a lot in his 
bank account which he cannot access because of the daily withdrawal limits set by the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) Anyway the policeman told me to get out of my car 
and he literally put his hands in my pocket, which had nothing of course but it was just 
wrong, he had no right to do that but again who do I report him to everyone is corrupt 
in this country. He then told me to leave him anything so I left some bread and drinks 
just so that could be on my way. 
                                                                                                                 Driver, Harare 
 
If there happens to be something wrong with a drivers‟ vehicle or papers then instead of 
writing a ticket and issuing it the policemen will tell the driver to “make a plan”. 
 
On my way to the airport I was stopped at a police roadblock and since I did not have 
my licence on me I was told to park the car and surrender my keys by one of the 
policemen. After some pleading and explanation that I was in such a hurry the 
policeman who seemed very stern and diligently doing his job when he stopped me 
accepted US $5 and let me go. The amount that would have been on the ticket had it 
been issued would have been much lower than the bribe but like most people I did not 
have the time, patience or will to argue with the policeman so I just gave him the 
bribe, he also did not seem too eager issue the ticket anyway.  
                                                                                                                  Driver, Harare 
 
This just shows that tthe police officers and Vehicle Inspection Department (VID) officers 
now have no respect for the high-way code when they are the ones who are supposed to 
ensure that its rules are adhered to in order to avoid endangering innocent lives. They let the 
drivers of vehicles that are not road worthy or drivers that should not be on the road go as 
long as they can pay the bribe. 
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3.7 CUSTOMS SECTOR 
The examples below are just some of the corrupt acts that take place at the Beitbridge border 
post. There are many others that may take some form or another the ones mentioned. Efforts 
to get the high level officials to discuss the corruption that takes place in their sector did not 
yield any results. This is a sensitive issue and they do not want to be quoted as having said 
something that would put their careers a risk which is understandable considering the fortunes 
that they probably make unlawfully. It is the lower ranking officials and the general public 
who were more forthcoming. 
 
3.7.1 Under declaration of goods  
At the Beitbridge border post the  cross-border traders are almost always racing against the 
clock because the sooner they  have their goods cleared through customs the sooner they have 
them in the market in Zimbabwe and the more profit they will make. As a result they are 
willing to bribe the officials so that they do not have to be at the border for long. For some 
though it is not the saving of time that matters most but the under declaration of their goods 
that the customs officials can facilitate. Hence they are willing to lurk around the customs 
buildings till dark when the faking of documents and the bribing of officials are the order of 
the day. There is an official table of customs clearance charges for all categories of 
merchandise. The false classification of goods involves placing them in a category that incurs 
a lower charge, thus minimizing the cost of their customs processing. One of my interviews 
with a border official was interrupted by a call from his „friend‟ who had just arrived from the 
South African side and needed to clear his goods. He was gone for almost an hour and when 
he came back he just said: 
 
Oh that was a good friend of mine who did not want to spend too long at the border so 
I had to go and help him out, now he is happily on his way home. He had gone to buy 
groceries at Musina so although I am not at work today I signed his customs 
declaration form and showed it to my colleagues on duty and he was on his way. This 
is my friend so they did not have to look at what he had bought. Of course he gave us 
all „yedrink‟. 
 
Judging from the “Kentucky Fried Chicken” take - away that this customs official was 
holding the trader was not the only one who was happy. He also got US $150 to share with his 
two colleagues. He also explained to me that sometimes they develop close relationships with 
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frequent cross-border traders that go beyond just a commercial one such that their exchange 
of services or favours generates systems of reciprocal obligation between them. A lady may 
actually end up referring to an official as my „son‟ and he refers to her as „mother‟. She will in 
turn bring him small gifts when she comes from the other side of the border and may also just 
phone once in a while to find out how her „son‟ is doing. 
 
This under declaration or none declaration of goods is also common at the airport as I realised 
when I arrived at the Harare International Airport. 
 
Having been on a 12 hour flight I was happy when I was approached by a porter who 
offered to “help me with my luggage”. I quickly agreed and as we waited for my bags 
he started updating me on the terrible economic situation that the country was now in. 
When my luggage came out loaded it onto the trolley and escorted me out of the 
airport. None of my three suitcases where opened for checking by the customs officials 
and so I did not declare anything. I gave him US $10 but he told me that it will be 
hard to share with the other two that he was working with. I then realised that he has 
to give his colleagues too so that they do not report him and so I gave him another US 
$5. 
 
3.7.2 Immigrant rebate 
This is a form of corruption at the border in which the government is losing a lot of revenue. 
For example if one imports a US $8 000 car that would attract duty of about US $7 000 one 
can put it in the name of a returning resident to avoid paying this duty. The customs official 
who clears the car at Beitbridge can be given US $500 to overlook this whilst the one whose 
name was used can get around US $1500. Often in these cases the bribe given to the official 
corresponds to the value that the customer will have saved. There is another form of rebate 
that is ethically wrong but yields large profits for the officials. 
 
We have the authority to confirm one‟s disability. I was supposed to do that for one 
guy who had bought a car for US $75 000 from Japan but he decided to go and have it 
done for him at the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) offices in Harare instead. 
He probably paid just 15% of the duty paid value (VDP) instead of the 90% or 110%  
if the car was 5years and below. The duty for luxury vehicles is paid in foreign 
currency so he would have paid a lot of money. The customs official that did it for him 
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in the capital may have taken home about US $20 000. This is a tricky issue though 
and one can only authorise a few disability cases a year to avoid raising eyebrows. 
                                                                                                         Customs Official, Beitbridge 
  
3.7.3 “Runners” 
The decentralization of customs services in one and the same administration, which forces 
clients to attend different offices for the customs clearance of just one item, is a source of 
minor irritation that many try to overcome by taking shortcuts that sometimes entail bribing 
the officials or hiring middle men known as “runners” who do not work in the customs 
officials but know what goes on at the border and work together with the customs officers so 
they do not wait in the queues. The frequent border crossers have permanent runners that they 
employ as I learnt from an entrepreneur who buys beverages form South Africa and sells 
them in Zimbabwe. 
 
In my business time is money especially during this festive period, to make sure that 
my drivers spend as little time as possible at the border I have a runner who works for 
me. My drivers give him the papers as soon as they arrive at the border and I give him 
about US $100 per truckload of beverages he clears on time. He probably shares this 
with some customs officials, I am not sure. I had another one but he increased his 
price to US $300 so I looked for someone cheaper. There are so many of them at the 
border these days. 
 
3.7.4 “Informal tax” on passengers 
The customs official also sometimes collect an „informal tax‟ usually SA 10 rands per person 
in the buses crossing the border so that they do not have to unload their goods for checking. 
They just pretend to be checking and then let the driver be on his way. Although this can be 
considered as extortion because no service is supplied here the passengers would rather pay 
than spend a lot of time at the border as this lady explained:  
 
When I was on a Tombs bus (a trans-border bus company) on my way back to 
Zimbabwe with my mother last month I was glad that we did not spend a lot of time at 
the border and our goods were not checked as we had bought a lot of electrical goods, 
way over US $500 each so we would have had to pay a lot of duty in foreign currency. 
At the border when the official approached the bus, the driver asked him “Officer 
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mauya nebhutsu dzenyu dzebhora here timbotamba?” (to you have your soccer shoes 
on today so that we can play). He said yes and the driver told us to pay SA 10 rands 
each to the official and send our passports forward so that the customs official would 
go and stamp them. We did not spend more than 20 minutes at the border which was 
great. But imagine since we were about 75 passengers we left the official around SA 
750 rands. Our bus is probably not the only one he did this to I know because there 
are some buses that these officials target and they will not let them pass without the 
passengers paying something. They even know the days and times that they pass and 
wait for them I think. I heard the police on the South African side are also doing this 
now. 
                                                                                                      Cross-border trader, Kwekwe 
 
Sometimes this informal tax is collected even when the buses are leaving to enter South 
Africa so that the bus jumps the line. The passengers may have to pay SA 20 rands each so 
that their bus goes to the front. Chapter 4 uses a model to explain these queues and the 
corruption involved in greater detail. 
 
 3.7.5 “Ignorance” 
The officials also take advantage of the traders lack of knowledge of what exactly happens 
behind the counters at the customs offices. 
 
People who come to the border do not really know what goes on in our customs offices 
and maybe think that our work is very complicated and almost “special” in a way. 
Sometimes we take advantage of this “ignorance” or rather lack of knowledge and 
either inflate their charges or pay charges that they are not supposed to at all. Since 
they may not understand the “complex” system of custom charges they would not want 
to argue with us. I know its bad but we also need to eat. 
                                                                                              Customs Offical, Beitbridge 
 
3.7.6 Bottlenecks 
Many public officials force their users to adapt to their schedules and to submit to or accept 
the timetables they set: „the user‟s time is not as important as that of the official‟ (Hertzfeld 
1992: 162). Thus the personal schedules of users are seriously disrupted by different forms of 
bureaucratic indifference, such as instructions to return the following day or the impossibility 
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of predicting the duration of administrative procedures. It is the officials who control the 
duration and the speed of the interaction with users. This makes the customs officials exploit 
this resource in corrupt exchanges as shown in the extract from an article “Nightmare at 
Beitbridge Border Post” posted in The Standard (A South African Newspaper) on 6 March 
2005.
9
  
 
“Where on earth do you get such sloppy service? Taking more than 12 hours to 
process a file? The answer might be that I was not the only customer, but on the day 
when I actually cried from tiredness I had waited for 16 hours without sleeping and 
there were only five customers. The evening shift came and went and then the morning 
shift came and was about to go while I was still there…………. One could tell that it‟s 
either they are seeking a bribe somehow or they are out to just exercise power or else 
they lack product knowledge. An example of the questions was: Why is the invoice 
written Mazda 323 and there was no Familia?, and why on the payment transfer 
document it was written Mazda Familia?. Anyone who knows cars will know that the 
answer lies in having a physical check on the vehicle. If you are an assessor then you 
should know your stuff, which includes cars. The other thing which baffled me was 
being told my telegraphic transfer was not authentic. As far as I was concerned that 
was the only proof of payment I had. How does one prove the authenticity of a bank 
confirmation document when this is what one was given at the bank to present to 
Zimra? If you are unlucky to find an officer who is in a bad mood he may decide that 
freight charges were not included and one maybe charged double on freight. The 
answer, of course, is the assessor has every right to doubt the authenticity of all your 
paper work. One ends up paying heavy duties and amounts, which are uncalled for 
because one is tired and has nowhere to complain. ………….” 
                                                                                                           Frustrated Citizen, Harare 
 
The officials may also create artificial bottlenecks or shortages so that they may offer faster 
individual service for payment. I experienced this at the ZIMRA offices in Harare when a 
government official told me that. 
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Yes we do not have anymore number plates but that is only for “povho” (the general 
public) but then for you “vehukama” (relatives) an arrangement can be made.  
 
He then showed me the ones that he had under his desk as proof and said that at US $10, I 
could have a set. 
 
3.7.7 Certificado de Inspección (CDI) forms 
When one is exporting goods from Zimbabwe they have to complete CDI forms at the border. 
For a product like tobacco one can expect to get around US $30 000 per truckload. This 
should be remitted to RBZ and one gets back about 60 percent of that money. In a normal 
economy one can access their foreign currency anytime but in Zimbabwe one has to apply to 
RBZ and state what they want to use their money for. It may take months before the request is 
approved or disapproved. As a result the exporters avoid filling out CDI forms, and just bribe 
the customs officials with maybe US $2 000 depending on the value of what they are 
exporting and nothing goes to RBZ. 
 
3.7.8 Vehicle Overloads and Project equipment approval 
At the border corruption also exists at the higher levels and involves larger sums of bribes. 
 
Here at the border if you snooze you loose I came to work here because there is an 
opportunity to make money, if the top officials at the head are corrupt then what about 
us at the tail. The VID officers who work here can take as much as US $30 000 a day 
through overweight trucks and they do not accept anything less than US $500 for 
overloaded vehicles. They also work with us at the bottom so that we do not tell on 
them and can give us maybe USD $1 000 depending on how much they themselves will 
have made. The top officials here are politically appointed and although they may be 
rotated at times the predecessor always tells his successor how he can make money so 
the rotation does not really solve the corruption problem. It is a vicious cycle that just 
goes on and on. Also when those officials responsible for the rotations pass through 
the border they have their cars filled with goods by their subordinates. So how can 
they remove or move such a subordinate? 
                                                                                                         Customs Official, Beitbridge 
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Another form of corruption that takes place at higher levels involves those that may be 
starting huge projects in the country for example a mine and have to import a lot of inputs. 
Although one is allowed to bring in all their initial equipment duty free, this has to be 
approved by the top officials at the customs offices. Most of the time this approval will be at a 
cost to the entrepreneur depending on the value of the equipment that they are bringing in. 
 
3.7.9 Border Jumpers 
Everyday there are a lot of border jumpers (desperate Zimbabweans forced to leave the 
country and enter South Africa illegally) who cross the border in search for a better life. 
Passage to cross the Limpopo River without a passport or a valid visa usually costs around SA 
100 rands which is given to the border police who sometimes even escort the jumpers part of 
the way. 
 
This chapter has given an insight into some of the forms of corruption that take place in the 
public sector but the next chapter will pay particular attention to the customs officials at the 
Beitbridge border post. It will use two models to make a rough forecast of what the corruption 
levels will be both in the near future and in the long run in the customs sector. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
METHODOLOGY 
4.I Model 1:  
4.1.1 Incentives for corrupt acts 
According to Adving and Moene a public bureaucrat, i.e. a member of a public organisation 
and in this chapter a customs official supplies a corrupt act if he directly or indirectly deals 
with a non-member using the public organisations resources to acquire payment against the 
rules of the organisation or against the law. These resources include the bureaucrats‟ own 
decision-making power and special information that is at his disposal in the public 
organisation. A member of the public who may be a cross-border trader or an ordinary citizen 
demands a corrupt act if he tries to bribe a bureaucrat. Then he will be known as a „briber‟ 
while the bureaucrats who take bribes as payments for illegal services are the „bribees‟. Some 
of the assumptions of the model are: 
-Only one corrupt service is transacted per period between the briber and the bribee. 
-Corrupt services are homogeneous therefore the level of corrupt transactions is indicated by 
the number of corrupt bureaucrats which is normalised to 1. 
-All potential bribers demand the same amount of corruption. 
-The bribees do not search for bribers as it is not in their best interest to be open that they are 
corrupt. 
Let: 
y = fraction of corrupt bureaucrats. 
= fraction of non-corrupt bureaucrats. 
N = number of trials, the briber has to search to find a willing bribee as he does not know who 
is corrupt and who is not. 
= the probability that he finds what he wants after exactly N trials.  
qi = the sum of moral and real costs involved in trying to bribe a bureaucrat for  the private 
agent i. 
b = price of corrupt services. 
= excess profit of obtaining corrupt services at a price b and . 
The expected profit of a briber, i.e. buyer of corrupt services is 
                                                                                                                      (1) 
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4.1.2 Why cross-border traders demand corrupt acts 
The traders will only take part in corruption if their expected profits are positive i.e. . 
Their moral and real costs, qi are low because petty corruption in the country has now become 
an accepted and expected way of life that is not condemned by society as much as before. 
People‟s moral values have been almost completely eroded due to the hardships that they face 
everyday whilst trying to make ends meet. Since the fraction of corrupt customs officials is 
quite high it lowers the search and transaction costs for the trader who has to go through less 
trials N, to find a willing bribee. This results in positive expected profits and hence their 
willingness to take part in corrupt acts. 
 
The demand for corrupt services is proportional to the number of traders with a positive Pi. 
This demand can be expressed as  
D D(b
_
, y)                                                                                                                                (2) 
Due to the positive expected profits there are a lot of traders who demand corrupt acts 
therefore the demand for corrupt acts is high. The higher the bribes b, the lower D is because 
high bribes result in lower profits for the traders after they sell their goods. If they pay high 
bribes they either incur the cost themselves by accepting a small profit margin so that they 
move their stocks quickly or transfer the cost to the end consumer and have less of their goods 
being bought and/or slower sales. All these possibilities are not good for the traders so they 
may lower their demand for corrupt acts the higher the bribes.  Since the expected search and 
transaction costs are lower the higher the incidence of corruption more private agents have 
positive Pi the higher y is. As a result the demand for corruption is an increasing function of y 
for a given b. 
 
Assuming that the D function is continuous and differentiable a suitable choice of units can 
derive the long run relationship between the bribe b and the normalized level of demand for 
corruption y which gives the equation y D(b,y)  which then gives b E(y) as the long run 
demand curve. This can be reduced to  
E '
b
y
1 Dy
Db
 
 
were Db 0 and 1 Dy 0  showing that the long run demand curve can be upward sloping 
with supply directly influencing demand. 
0iP
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 4.1.3 Why customs officials supply corrupt acts  
The incentives for a bureaucrat to act in an honest way are the same as those that make a 
worker in a private firm put in the required effort (cf.Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). The worker 
needs a salary high enough to induce him to put in this required effort and for the customs 
official at the border, his wage needs to be high enough to make him honest and not use the 
organisations resources for his private gain. The wages of the customs officials and their 
colleagues in the public sector are so low that those who go to work only do so to use the 
organisations resources for their private gain and are not motivated to be honest. With many 
people going to look for greener pastures in other countries those that are benefiting from 
corrupt acts see no reason to leave.  
Other assumptions of the model are: 
 
-All bureaucrats have utility functions that are linear in money and receive the same salary w 
per period. 
-The value of the outside option = 0.  
With the unemployment rate at 80 percent, the value of the outside option for the customs 
official is almost 0 because it will be very difficult for him to get employed if he is caught 
being corrupt and fired. This increases his costs of supplying corrupt acts. 
-w therefore reflects the wage differential between the public and private sectors corrected for 
the expected waiting time. 
-w is strictly positive. 
-Bureaucrats are heterogeneous with respect to the costs of supplying corrupt services.   
These costs may either be internalized moral costs or organisational costs related to the 
positions of the bureaucrats. The higher a rank one has the more one probably has to lose if he 
is caught cheating. Besides losing his job and benefits his reputation is also damaged more so 
than an official with a lower rank. The customs officials also have different moral costs 
depending on their moral values which may have nothing to do with their positions. 
-Each bureaucrat has the option to follow either a corrupt or a non-corrupt strategy. 
-He has an infinite horizon and discounts future income with the discount factor: 
 
 
The expected value of the options of the rational bureaucrat i in period t is: 
 
                                                                                 (3 
1 (1 r)
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Were: b = bribe. 
          ci = bureaucrat i‟s cost of providing corrupt services. 
         = expected gain of choosing to be corrupt in period t. 
 
If the bureaucrat decides to be honest and non-corrupt he is sure to keep his job and obtains 
in the coming period. The loss of future income is not much of a motivation for 
honesty for the corrupt customs official because his wage is very low. If he can make his 
salary for the next two, three or even ten years in a single corrupt act then he is likely to be 
dishonest. It may more so be the loss of the opportunity to supply corrupt acts in the future 
that may induce the official to be honest in the present period. Also if the risk of getting 
caught in the near future is high then he may try to get as much as he can before he is caught. 
But again if one is so used to be corrupt and getting away with it one can get comfortable and 
almost forget that he can get caught and be fired. This is sometimes the case in Zimbabwe 
were many people are either busy with their own corrupt acts and making sure that they do 
not get caught that they may not be bothered with the corruption of their fellow bureaucrats 
and  just turn a blind eye. There are some bureaucrats though who are honest so the corrupt 
customs official is at risk of being caught by a corrupt colleague or an honest one.  
The expected consequences of being corrupt are: 
 
                                                   (4) 
 
Were: s = the exogenously determined probability of being caught in corrupt               
              transactions and 0 s 1. 
           = the probability of not being caught. 
 
If the corrupt bureaucrat is not caught he can start the next period with the same options as he 
had in the present one. His consequences of being caught depend on whether he is caught by a 
corrupt colleague or an honest one. If he is caught by a non-corrupt colleague he is reported to 
higher ranking officials who are assumed to be honest. These would immediately confisticate 
the bribe b and fire the corrupt bureaucrat. But in reality at the border not all superiors are 
honest as some are even involved in the corrupt acts with their subordinates, here the reported 
corrupt official may not be fired but just given a warning although in other cases even though 
they may have done some corrupt acts together the superior may feel that protecting the 
)(tUcb ii
)1(tVi
))(1()))1(()1()1()( bytVystVstU iii
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corrupt subordinate and not firing him is too obvious and may damage his own reputation so 
he is left with no choice but to dismiss him. Therefore in being corrupt there is a probability 
 of obtaining  as the best option in the coming period considering that the 
utility level outside the public sector is equal to 0. 
 
On the other hand if he is caught by a corrupt colleague he can bribe him immediately with a 
bribe = B so that he does not report the case and hence he keeps his job. As a result there is a 
probability sy of obtaining  in the coming period. This bribe B can take on 
different values. It can be equal to 0 when corrupt bureaucrats agree not to report each other 
in a „tit for tat strategy‟ which means that if you do not report me then I will not report you 
too when and if I catch you being corrupt in the future. The two can also bargain and share the 
gain of not being fired which is the future income of the corrupt bureaucrat. In the third case 
which is used in this models‟ formal derivations and the one that is most common among the 
customs officials B = b, i.e. the potential reporter receives the same bribe as that acquired by 
the corrupt bureaucrat. 
 
A bureaucrat who would choose to be corrupt faced with an external bribe b will also accept 
the same amount of bribe b to perform the corrupt act of not reporting the colleague that he 
has caught. Anything less would be unfair leaving him disgruntled and putting the corrupt 
official who has been caught at a risk of being reported to an honest superior. We therefore 
have the same equation determining Vi for those who choose to be corrupt independently by 
directly accepting bribes from non-members of the bureaucratic organisation or taking them 
via other bureaucrats in their organisation. 
 
In the model stationarity is assumed so  and  for all t. From (3) we can 
then find the expected present value of following a non-corrupt strategy (which is the best 
option for those bureaucrats with sufficiently high ci values and it is not rewarding to be 
corrupt) is. 
 
                                                                                                                                (5) 
 
This is also the present value of future salaries that one would get if he keeps his job by being 
honest. 
s(1 y) ( b 0)
( B Vi)
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1
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The expected present value of following a corrupt strategy is: 
 
                                                                                                              (6) 
 
This equation shows that as long as  is positive the pay-off of choosing a corrupt strategy is 
higher the higher its incidence i.e. the higher is y. At the border most of the customs officials 
are corrupt resulting in a high y. This means that the expected present value of following a 
corrupt strategy is also high and greater than the expected value of following a non-corrupt 
strategy hence the customs officials will only be behaving rationally by choosing to be 
corrupt. This rational behaviour results in an even greater fraction of corrupt officials making   
the expected present value of following a corrupt strategy even greater than that of following 
a non-corrupt one. This vicious cycle of corruption then leads to a high corruption equilibrium 
level, a stage which maybe difficult to reverse in the long-run. The higher y is the lower the 
chances of being caught by a non-corrupt colleague and being reported to an honest superior.  
 
A rational bureaucrat chooses to be corrupt when . From (5) and (6) and using 
this reduces to: 
                                                                                                         (7) 
 
Were:  = expected money gain of corruption. 
           = expected retained value of the bribe.  
            = expected loss of future incomes.  
For a bureaucrat to be corrupt his costs, ci must be less than the expected money gain from 
corruption but greater than expected retained value of the bribe. 
Each bureaucrat is associated with a level of costs ci which are distributed over an interval  
[ ] with a cumulative density such that F(c) 0  and F(c) 1 The proportion of the 
bureaucrats who choose to be corrupt is  for given values of y, b, w, s 
and r. The number of corrupt bureaucrats is higher:
 
 
-the higher the perceived fraction of corrupt bureaucrats y;  
As mentioned earlier in this paper corruption is an accepted and expected way of doing 
business at the border. As a result the cross-border traders who demand the corrupt acts 
Vi
c w b(1 s) ci
1 (1 s(1 y))
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c
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expect that most of the customs officials that they are dealing with are corrupt and so offer a 
bribe for their services. This may tempt those otherwise honest officials. In some cases bribes 
are accepted for procedures that may otherwise have not required any bribery. 
 
-the higher the bribes b;  
A lot of the people who cross the border may not know how their duty is calculated by the 
customs officials. As a result they end up paying more that they are supposed to. The customs 
officials may also take advantage of the fact that the traders want to spend as little time at the 
border as possible and demand high bribes. 
 
-the lower the salary w;  
The very low wages of the officials result in a high number of corrupt customs officials as 
they are left with no choice but to supplement their income through dishonest means. 
 
-the lower the exogenously given detection probability s;  
Some reasons why this is so at the border are that, the supervision is very low and almost non- 
existent, since almost everyone is being corrupt they are occupied with not being caught 
themselves that they may not really be concerned with what their colleagues and subordinates 
are doing and they also let each other in on their corrupt deals to avoid whistle blowers. 
 
-the higher the discount rate r; 
The discount factor  can also can be viewed as the probability that the present 
bureaucratic regime remains in power in the succeeding period assuming that the corrupt 
bureaucrat will be unemployed if a new regime which may not tolerate corrupt acts comes 
into power hence no future income. The higher the probability of a regime shift the higher is r 
and the higher is the incidence of corruption and a perceived value of y as the bureaucrats, 
especially those appointed because of their political affiliation with the ruling party try to 
acquire as much as they can to cushion themselves against the anticipated negative impacts of 
a possible regime shift. The economic and political situation in the country at the moment is 
very volatile and its future is uncertain. There may not be threat of a complete regime shift but 
the resultant inclusive government from the power-sharing agreement may lead to a better 
rule of law and intolerance of corrupt acts making the future of the corrupt officials bleak. 
 
1 (1 r)
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 can be considered  as a response function indicating the number of 
bureaucrats who choose to be corrupt for a perceived level of y. Therefore the positive 
equilibrium levels of y and b must satisfy  
 
      for                                                                                 (8) 
 
 b = E(y)                                                                                                                                   (9) 
 
(8) and (9) describe self–fulfilling consistent beliefs about the incidence of corruption and the 
equilibrium bribes. Mathematically they also describe Nash equilibria in the game theoretic 
sense in which: 
-all bureaucrats know each others ci values. 
-everyone predicts the equilibrium level(s) of y on the basis of rational behaviour from all 
bureaucrats. 
In reality though each bureaucrat may not know so much about the costs of the others but 
knows his own cost ci and just observes last periods level of corruption and uses that to 
adjusts his choice rationally in the present period. 
Therefore we can write . When y(t) y(t 1) a stationary 
equilibrium is reached. Such an equilibrium y* is locally stable if a small deviation from y* in 
period t leads to a conversion back to y*. This is called the myopic adjustment case. 
 
4.1.4 Possible corruption levels in the customs sector 
Different equilibria incidences of corruption have their corresponding market clearing bribe 
values. The distribution of ci over the bureaucrats determines the possible equilibrium levels 
and there may frequently exist multiple equilibria. 
 
The value y = 1, i.e. all the bureaucrats being corrupt is in the equilibrium set if; 
                                                                                           
(1 s)E(1) c                                                                                                                          (10) 
 
this means that the expected value of the equilibrium bribe when all bureaucrats are corrupt 
exceeds the cost of the least corrupt prone bureaucrat. 
The value y = 0, i.e. no bureaucrats being corrupt is in the equilibrium set if; 
F((1 s)b s(1 y)w /r
F((1 s)b s(1 y)w /r y 0 y 1
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meaning that the expected value of the equilibrium bribe when all others are honest is not 
high enough to cover the expected loss of future salaries and the costs of the most corrupt 
bureaucrat. 
 
4.1.5 Bell shaped distribution of ci 
This is the distribution of ci that applies most to the customs officials whose costs follow a 
normal distribution. This results in the case illustrated in fig. 2 with three possible equilibrium 
levels of y on the supply side for a given value of b. These are points that correspond to the 
Intersections between the y and F-curves. This model focuses on the myopic adjustment case 
in which y1 and y3 are the stable equilibria. If the perceived level of corruption is below the 
critical mass y2 the process converges step by step to y1 but if it is above y2 it converges to y3. 
According to TI (2008) Zimbabwe is slowly heading towards the high corruption level y3 and 
so has passed the critical mass y2. A change in a number of factors over the years has resulted 
in this approach towards high corruption equilibrium. Some of these factors are presented in 
fig. 3. This paper uses Adving and Moene‟s model to make a rough forecast of what might 
happen to the level of corruption in the customs sector especially at the Beitbridge border post 
in the short and long run depending on how the equilibrium supply of corruption responds to 
different values of the bribe price which is determined by the factors in fig. 3.  
 
Possible corruption levels in the short run. 
Having started in a low corruption equilibrium an increase in the bribe b at the border post 
shifted the F-curve upwards as shown in fig. 4. This was mostly due to the bad economic 
situation in the country which resulted in workers receiving very low wages and hence 
resorting to corruption and increasing its supply. As the situation continues to worsen the 
moral values of the society are continuously being lowered as petty corruption is seen as a 
justifiable way to make a living given their low salaries.  The deterioration of the economy  
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Figure 2 : Possible equilibrium for bell-shaped distribution of cost 
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Figure 3: Factors that determine the corruption equilibrium level     
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also saw the disintegration of the rule of law, if one knows the right people or has money then 
he will not be punished for his unlawful behaviour. The lack of basic commodities increased 
the demand for corrupt acts at the border greatly as many became cross-border traders and 
more and more individuals were crossing over to South Africa to buy essentials.  
 
The highest bribe which sustained this low equilibrium is b1 shown by the highest stipulated 
curve. The supply of „low level‟ corruption is continuous and increasing in b for b < b1 but 
for b values just above b1 the equilibrium supply of corruption will jump to point z and the 
sector will be in a „high level‟ corruption equilibrium. With the continued collapse of the 
economy the bribe price may soon be higher than b1. The lowest bribe which will sustain this 
high equilibrium is b2 as illustrated by the lowest stipulated curve b2. The „high level‟ supply 
of corrupt services is a continuous increasing function of b for b > b2 but for values of b just 
below b2 the equilibrium supply of corruption will jump to t and the sector will be in a „low 
level‟ corruption equilibrium.  This shows that if the power sharing deal yields positive results 
soon and the economic situation improves resulting in higher wages, a campaign to restore 
peoples‟ moral values, more supervision, better rule of law and a decrease in the demand for 
corrupt acts the bribe price and corruption levels may decrease. Points x and k are low and 
high tipping points  that correspond to unstable intermediate points like point y2 in fig. 2, they 
are of little relevance in our myopic adjustment case. This shift back to the low corruption 
equilibrium level may not be so easy in the long run and the sector may be stuck in the high 
level corruption equilibrium. 
 
Possible corruption levels in the long run. 
Fig. 5 illustrates the forecast of the corruption level in the customs sector in the long-run with 
b1, b2, t, x, k, z referring to points in fig. 4. The „low level‟ supply curve L is relevant for b 
values in the interval [b1,b2] only when we start out in a „low level‟ equilibrium where b < b2.  
The „high level‟ supply curve H is relevant for b values in the interval [b1,b2] only when we 
start out in a „high level‟ equilibrium where b > b1. The dotted downward sloping part of the 
supply curve is unstable as mentioned earlier. Although this supply structure and an 
increasing long run demand function E(y) may result in one, two or three equilibrium levels of 
y the model only focuses on the two equilibrium case. Fig. 5 shows that when the sector is in 
the high level of corruption it will also have a high equilibrium bribe. In the long-run some 
temporary changes that have occurred in the underlying parameters may shift the sector from 
a low corruption to a high level corruption equlibrium. Due to the ratchet effects of the supply 
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Figure 4: Short-run equilibrium supply response to different values of the bribe 
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Figure 5: Long-run equilibrium supply response to different values of the bribe                                                                                             
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side these temporary shifts may give rise to permanent changes. Some of these changes that 
have taken place are: 
i) Demand has temporarily increased as more and more people are crossing the border for 
basic commodities inducing the short-run equilibrium price to go up above b1 such that the 
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supply of corrupt services will jump into the high level regime. When demand reduces to the 
normal level the equilibrium might settle on this high corruption equilibrium level. 
 
ii) The probability of a regime shift has temporarily increased due to the political and 
economic uncertainty and officials have become more corrupt prone for each level of the 
bribe. This can eventually lower the critical bribe b1 in the fig. 3 and the equilibrium may 
jump into the high corruption level regime. When the uncertainty is resolved and the value of 
r goes back to its normal level the situation will be trapped at the high corruption equilibrium 
level.  
 
iii) Moral costs of taking bribes have been lowered as corruption has become the only way to 
survive for the customs officials. Although a better economic environment in which people do 
not have to be corrupt to make ends meet may restore these moral values the sector may be 
trapped in the high corruption equilibrium level. Considering a first order leftward shift in the 
distribution of ci  means that every element ci is reduced with the same amount  and the new 
equilibria are characterized by 
 
     for  0 y 1                                                                 (12) 
 
.                                                                                                                                (13) 
 
If  increases from 0 the F curve will shift upwards as shown in fig. 4 implying a higher 
supply of corrupt acts to each level of the bribe. Both the low and high tipping points x and k 
will consequently be reduced the more so the higher is . In fig. 5 this increase shifts both the 
L and H curves to the right and lowers the critical bribes b1 and b2 as indicated by the curves 
L′ and H′. As long as the long run demand curve is upward sloping the equilibrium bribes are 
also increasing in . 
 
When supply and demand determine the bribe it is economically expected that an increase in 
the supply would decrease the equilibrium bribe. Currently in the customs sector it is the 
opposite as predicted in the model. Although there might be an increase in the supply of  
corrupt acts at the border the increase in the demand may even be greater resulting in an 
increase in the equilibrium bribe. It may not be the case though that the corruption jumps 
yrwysbsF )/)1()1((
b E(y)
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from one equilibrium level to the other but it is a gradual step by step process that takes years 
or even decades. As a result it may also take a long time for the corruption level in this sector 
and the country as a whole to go back to the low corruption equilibrium level even after the 
economic situation in the country has improved. 
                                                                                                                                                      
The return to the low level corruption equilibrium  may  be slowed down further by the greed 
among both low and high ranking officials. Some of the officials have become accustomed to 
certain lifestyles that they feel a need to maintain through the continued supply of corrupt 
acts. This lifestyle is not one that these corrupt officials flaunt to their colleagues because they 
do not want to risk being investigated. The corruption by the customs officials might have 
started because of greed when their wages could still sustain them. As the economic situation 
is worsening and more officials cannot meet their basic living costs some have became 
corrupt as a means to survive moving the sector towards the high level corruption 
equilibrium. When the economic situation starts getting better the officials will no longer be 
desperate as they can again live on their monthly remunerations but then the greed will still 
exist amongst some. This will result in a cycle of corruption that starts and ends with greed. 
There are other cost distributions that may not apply to the corruption in the customs sector 
and these are briefly discussed below. 
 
4.1.6 Identical ci values 
In a special case all bureaucrats are identical, i.e. ci = ĉ for all i. Returning to the equilibria 
described by (8) and (9) we have either y = 1 or y = 0 in equilibrium and for given values of s 
and w both extremes can be in equilibrium. This is so if  
                          
                                                                                        (14) 
    
using (10) and (11). When (14) applies we find from (7) the critical mass 
 
,                                                                                                                 (15) 
where all bureaucrats are indifferent between being corrupt and being non-corrupt. This 
incidence of corruption is unstable. If the perceived y is higher than ŷ the equilibrium 
converges to y = 1 but if the perceived value of y is lower than ŷ the equilibrium converges to 
y = 0. 
(1 s)E(1) sw /r ˆ c (1 s)E(0)
1 ˆ y 
(1 s)b ˆ c 
sw /r
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The equilibrium supply of corrupt services as a function of the value of the bribe depends on 
the initial situation. Starting by increasing b from b = 0, we get y = 0 as the equilibrium for all 
values of b such that the left hand of the inequality (12) holds, i.e. for b (c s /w) /(1 s). 
Higher values of b induce all bureaucrats to become corrupt. From fig. 6 it can be seen that 
b (c sw /r) /(1 s)  starting from  and successively reducing b, y = 1 is the equilibrium as 
long as .  
 
4.1.7 Uniform distribution of ci 
The costs ci can be uniformly distributed over the interval [ ]. If both (10) and (11) hold we 
have a similar situation as in identical ci values. If neither (10) nor (11) hold we have a unique 
stable supply side equal to y* shown in fig. 7. Here there is an increasing supply of corrupt 
transactions as a function of the bribe. There is a stable equilibrium level of b and y if the 
slope of the supply curve is steeper than that of the demand curve. 
 
4.1.8 Double peaked distribution of ci 
In this scenario shown in fig. 8 there are three stable supply side equilibria i.e. L, M, H for all 
values of b. This may result in a three long run equilibria of b and y. 
 
 
Figure 6: Possible equilibrium levels for  identical cost values                   
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           Figure 7: Possible equilibrium levels for uniform distribution of costs 
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Figure 8: Possible equilibrium levels for double peaked distribution of costs                                                                                       
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4.2 Model 2: 
4.2.1 Waiting time at the border for the bus drivers  
Ratchet effects on the demand side of corruption can be illustrated using an example of bus 
drivers bribing the customs officials in order to reduce their waiting time at the border. For 
both the drivers and their passengers it is of paramount importance that they spend as little 
time as possible at the border especially when they are crossing over to go to the South 
African side. The passengers want to quickly buy their goods and head back home whilst the 
drivers do not want their timetables disrupted by delays at the border. As a result sometimes 
they are willing to bribe the officials so that they will go to the front of the line but at times 
the bribe price is so high that it is not worth it to pay it as will be shown by this model using 
figs 9 and 10. 
 
Let: 
d - c0 = cost of waiting for those who bribe 
e - c1 = cost of waiting for those who do not bribe, here no-one bribes 
a - c3 = cost of waiting for those who bribe + the bribe that they pay                                        
c0- c3 = the bribe price 
α = fraction of buses that bribe their way through the border 
1-α = fraction of buses that do not bribe their way through the border 
A(α) = the cost  bribing 
C(α) = the cost of not bribing 
 
When the bribe = b1 there will be two equilibria as shown in fig. 9.  
Equilibrium 1: No corruption 
No-one pays since the bribe is higher than the cost of waiting i.e. b > d. Here all the drivers 
will choose to wait and the equilibrium will be at c1 with no corruption.  
 
Equilibrium 2: Full corruption 
Here when some drivers decide to pay then all the others will find it rational to do so as well 
because the one who does not pay will end up always being at the end of the line. These 
ratchet effects in the demand will result in the equilibrium being at a, with full corruption. 
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4.2.2 Decrease in the bribe  
Equilibrium 1: Full corruption 
The bribe can decrease from b1 to b2 if the economic situation worsens increasing the supply 
of corrupt acts. This decreases the cost of those who bribe from c3 to c3‟. When this happens 
the new cost of waiting for those who bribe c3‟ becomes less than the cost for those who do 
not bribe therefore all the drivers will decide to bribe and the new equilibrium will be at f, 
with full corruption. 
 
4.2.3 Increase in the number of buses 
The worsening of the economy may result in more people crossing the border and this 
increases the number of buses as well as the demand for corrupt acts as shown in fig. 10. This 
increase also happens periodically during the peak periods when there is a lot of traffic 
crossing the border such that those who choose not to pay may end up spending about two 
days or more at the border post. This will be a great inconvenience to both the passengers and 
the drivers. In this case there is only one equilibrium with full corruption as explained below. 
 
Equilibrim 1: Full corruption                                                                                                  
When the number of buses increases the cost of waiting for those who bribe, d - c0 increases 
since their gain from bribing has also increased and the curve tilts to d’ - c0. This increase is 
equal to that for those who do not bribe which is from e - c1 to e’ - c1’. As a result all the 
drivers decide to bribe the customs official and the consequences of the one that does not pay 
is great as he will end up at the end of the queue and may be  spend a few days at the border. 
The ones that arrive after him may even leave before him if they do decide to pay. There will 
be full corruption  at e, were all the drivers pay since their cost of bribing plus the bribe is the 
same for all and  less than the cost of waiting at the border .i.e. A (α) + b < C(α). 
 
Here it shows that when everyone pays it does not help in aggregate but benefits  the customs 
official who may take advantage and  slow down his work to make the willingness to pay 
(WTP) of the drivers increase and hence increase the bribe price.  
 
These two models have shown that there are ratchet effects in both the supply and demand 
side of corrupt acts which may lead to a high level corruption equilibrium or full corruption. 
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Figure 9: Corruption levels for bus drivers at the border                     
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Figure 10: Corruption levels after an increase in the number of buses                      
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
Although corruption is widespread and systematic throughout the public sector in Zimbabwe 
it takes different forms which need to be known, acknowledged and accepted if the country is 
to move back to a low level corruption equilibrium and minimise the possibility of 
recorruption. It is also important to understand the rational responses of the bribers and 
bribees to the different factors that affect the corruption level through the bribe price in. This 
understanding helps give a rough forecast of the corruption levels in both the short and long 
run in the different sectors and the country as a whole. In the short run a shift to a high 
corruption level is easily reversible when the bribe price decreases beyond a certain level but 
this maybe difficult in the long run. With the economic situation worsening the bribe price in 
the customs sector is likely to continue increasing and the sector will be in a high level 
corruption equilibrium which will be very difficult to reverse. The ratchet effects in the 
demand side of corrupt acts will also contribute to full corruption in some sections of the 
sector. But if the inclusive government works towards the recovery of the economy, better 
wages, more efficiency, accountability, transparency and rule of law in the public sector then 
the situation may change resulting in a decrease of the bribe price.  
 
Limitations: 
Although the agency model by Adving and Moene is very relevant for the study of petty 
corruption one of its main assumptions that the high level officials are honest and will fire the 
corrupt official may not always apply in the customs sector where even the senior officials are 
known to be very corrupt. Efforts to get interviews with them yielded no results but they 
would probably have agreed with this assumption because they would want to give a false 
image of honesty. Some of these high level officials are also involved in corrupt acts with 
their subordinates so future researchers can consider these relationships which may help to 
show some of the links between petty and grand corruption. 
 
It was important to have a lot of interviews to get a picture of the extent of the corruption in 
the country than just take the CPI Indices as they are considering that the surveys on which 
the index is based may not ask the same questions, start from the same definition of 
  
49 
corruption or have the same ethical and moral yardstick. It was evident however that the 
incidence of corruption in the public sector and the country as a whole is great. 
 
Implications for further research: 
These interviews revealed that corruption is a huge problem in the country that needs to be 
addressed but they were just a drop in the ocean. A lot of sectoral research still needs to be 
done to understand the culture of corruption in Zimbabwe although many of the forms 
mentioned are the same as those found by Blundo, Olivier de Sardan,  Arifari  and Alou in 
their research in Benin, Niger and Senegal from 1999 to 2001 and  documented in their book, 
“Everyday Corruption and the state: Citizens and Public Officials In Africa”(2006).  
 
Although the thesis has shown that the customs sector might be approaching a high level 
corruption equilibrium in the long run it is important to note that corruption is not an 
irresolvable problem. The sector may not necessarily be stuck in this high corruption level but 
it may just be more difficult and take a longer time to return to a low level corruption 
equilibrium, it is not impossible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
50 
References 
 
Adving and Moene 1989. How Corruption May Corrupt. Journal of Economic Behaviour & 
Organization, Elsevier Publishers, vol. 13(1), pages 63-76 
 
Arvind K. Jain 2001.Corruption: A review. Journal of Economic Surveys, vol 15(1), pages 
71-121, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, USA 
 
Bertram I. Spector 2005. Fighting Corruption in Developing Countries. Cumarian Press, Inc , 
Bloomfield , USA 
 
Blundo G, Olivier de Sardan J.P, Arifari N.B, Alou M.T. 2006. Everyday Corruption and the 
state: Citizens and Public Officials In Africa. Glosderry, South Africa 
 
David J. Gould and Jose A. Amaro-Reyes 1983. The Effects of Corruption Administrative 
Performance Illustrations from Developing Countries. World Bank Staff Working Papers No. 
580 and Management And Development Series No. 7.The World Bank Washington, D.C., 
U.S.A. 
 
Kempe R. Hope 1997. African Political Economy: Contemporary Issues in Development 
M.E. Sharpe 
 
Makumbe, John 1994. Bureaucratic Corruption in Zimbabwe: Causes and Magnitude of the 
Problem. Africa Development, vol 19(3) 
 
Martinez-Vazquez Jorge, Arze del Granado Javier, Boex Jameson 2007. Fighting Corruption 
in the Public Sector. Linacre House, Jordan Hill, Oxford U.K 
 
Mukum Mbaku, John 2007. Corruption in Africa: Causes, Consequences, and Cleanups 
Lexington Books 
 
Shana, Goodwin 2006. The State of Corruption In Zimbabwe. unpublished, Harare. 
 
Transparency International (2008), www.transparencyinternational.org 
  
51 
Wikipedia (2008), http://wikipedia.org/ 
 
Google (2008), http://www.google.com 
